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Title insurance and fraudulent loans: 
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v XWarehouse Lending, 2009 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Victim of fraudulently made loans not protected by title insurance issued to purported 
originating lender. 
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v XWarehouse Lending Corp. (2009) 177 CA4th 106, 98 CR3d 801 
 
Access Lending Corporation (Access), which changed its name to XWarehouse Lending Corp. 
during this litigation, is in the business of “warehousing” real property loans during the time 
between origination and sale in the secondary mortgage market. In a 2004 Master Repurchase 
Agreement (MRA), CHL Mortgage Group (CHL) agreed to originate mortgage loans to 
individual borrowers to be resold to Access. The promissory note and deed of trust would be sold 
and assigned to Access, to be repurchased by CHL for sale and delivery in the secondary 
mortgage market. The MRA also provided that at CHL’s election, the purchase price could be 
funded by funds transferred directly from Access to the closing agent on behalf of CHL, 
provided that Access verified possession of the closing documents by the closing agent and that 
CHL delivered the mortgage document for the loan to Access within 3 business days of closing. 
 
In two transactions in 2004, the funds were transferred directly from Access to the closing 
agent. At closing, the escrow agents released the funds as a payoff to CHL to refinance the 
named borrowers’ existing loans. First American issued title policies for the mortgage loans with 
CHL as named insured. However, CHL failed to repurchase the loans from Access and the 
borrowers never made any payments to Access. Access began separate foreclosure proceedings 
against the two borrowers. One borrower challenged Access’s right to the proceeds of the 
foreclosure sale. The other borrower forestalled forecl sure with an affidavit that the signatures 
on the note and deed of trust had been forged and began quiet title litigation. Access tendered its 
claim for defense costs to First American, which refus d tender, and brought its own action for 
declaratory relief. The trial court granted summary judgment for First American, holding that 
Access was not an insured and thus was not entitled o coverage under the policies. The court of 
appeal affirmed. 
 
In addition to naming CHL as the insured in the policies, the policies also defined the insured 
(and its successors) as the owner of the indebtedness s cured by the mortgage. Access’s 
arguments for a broad definition of indebtedness so as to cover the transfers made by Access 
through escrow to CHL were unavailing. The term “indebtedness” reasonably can only refer to 
that reflected in the “insured mortgage” defined as the deed of trust from each named borrower 
to CHL to secure an indebtedness from the borrower to CHL. In addition, to meet the definition 
of an insured under the policy, there must be an existing indebtedness between borrower and 
lender. In other words, for Access to qualify for cverage as a successor to CHL, there must have 
been a valid underlying indebtedness for the title insurer to be liable. See McClellan Realty v 
Institutional Investors Trust (MD Pa 1988) 714 F Supp 733, aff’d without opinion (3d Cir 1989) 
879 F2d 858. Access did not meet the definition of an insured under the title policy because there 
was no transfer of funds between CHL and borrower; there was no valid underlying 
indebtedness. Moreover, Access’s losses were not sustained or incurred by reason of the 
invalidity or unenforceability of the lien, but by the absence of an existing indebtedness between 
CHL and the borrowers. If the named borrowers had received the benefit of the loans, then the 
deeds of trust would have been enforceable. See Pacific Am. Constr. v Security Union Title (Utah 
1999) 987 P2d 45, 47.  
 
Under the MRA, Access obtained warranties and a first p iority lien in specified collateral 
owned by CHL and status as an additional loss payee on CHL’s errors and omissions insurance 
or mortgage impairment insurance and fidelity bond coverage. Access’s losses and defense costs 
were not recoverable under First American’s policies b cause they were not caused by any defect 
in the title or mortgage liens. Rather, the failure of the indebtedness between the named 
borrowers and CHL caused the losses. (The court of appeal also noted other litigation involving 
CHL and Access and CHL’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy, as well as the federal imprisonment of 
CHL’s president, who had pleaded guilty to fraud offenses.) 
 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: I have read this opinion a number of times and I confess to still 
not understanding what it means when it says that title insurance “insures against defects in 
the mortgage itself, but not against problems arising from or related to the underlying debt.” 
The court says that “a mortgage lien and the mortgage debt are two entirely different legal 
concepts or species,” but that is a distinction that is awfully subtle to grasp. I know that a 
mortgage can be bad even though the debt is good (e.g., when the note was signed but the 
mortgage was not), but if a debt is bad, the mortgage purporting to secure it is also always 
bad, because a mortgage by definition needs a debt to support it. If the mortgage was 
insured, why is the loss not covered when an underlying bad debt has made it into a bad 
mortgage? 
 
When I look at a title insurance policy that declares that it insures against losses incurred 
by reason of “the invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage,” I do not 
see where it says that this coverage excludes a mortgage that is invalid or unenforceable 
because there was no enforceable underlying obligation for it to secure. I wonder whether 
an ordinary insured party appreciates that limitation in coverage. 
 
I understand the financial argument that a title insurer probably has not investigated the 
validity of the underlying loan transaction such as to be expected to underwrite that risk. 
But, on the other hand, all real estate professionals expect title insurance to cover the risk in 
an owner’s policy that the estate in land ostensibly held by the insured was effectively 
conveyed to her through a chain of authentic and deliver d deeds, even though the insurer 
has undoubtedly not actually investigated the validity of those underlying transactions. How 
is the burden of taking on that risk different when the policy covers the mortgage on the title 
rather than the title itself? 
 
It is easy to understand why the policy would not cver the mortgage broker itself, since 
CHL never made a loan at all, having rather simply stolen loan funds that its warehouse 
lender had advanced; it was also clearly disqualified from insurance protection on the 
grounds that it had itself caused any loss that occurred and it itself had suffered no loss. But 
the warehouse lender, Access Lending, was not guilty of any of that—it had suffered a real 
loss of funds, and it had not been the cause of that loss. 
 
First American successfully argued that Access was not an insured under a policy that 
named CHL as a covered party. But the policy defined “insured” as including “each 
successor in ownership of the indebtedness.” Access rtainly looks like a successor, and 
the nonexistence of the indebtedness looks remarkably similar to the nonexistence of a fee 
interest in an owner’s policy. (Any analogy to owners’ policies on this point is weak, since 
those generally do not insure their successors, like lender’s policies do, although even they 
usually continue coverage following intrafamily transfers. In the secondary market, if 
coverage of successors is really limited as was held re, then participants in that industry 
had better start reconsidering how they behave.) 
 
In a footnote, the court refers to earlier California cases, holding them to be different 
because “moneys had been actually dispersed or credited to the named borrower by either 
the lender or its assignee.” However, one of those cases, Coast Mut. Building-Loan Ass’n v 
Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co. (1936) 14 CA2d 225, 57 P2d 1392, looks so similar to this 
case that I could not really tell it apart, except that the mortgage loss was held to be covered 
by the title insurance there. (So does another decision, California Pac. Title & Trust Co. v 
MacArthur (1934) 1 CA2d 323, 36 P2d 413, except that it assumed coverage rather than 
explicitly holding it to exist.) Those decisions dealt with earlier policies of title insurance, 
but I do not see significant differences in the wording of the crucial provisions as to matter. 
 
In a related case, now pending in different district of the court of appeal, another lender 
of CHL is suing the escrow company for similar losses. Keep an eye out for round two of 
this extremely interesting saga.—Roger Bernhardt 
 
